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LADIES' NIGHT DISCOUNTS: SHOULD WE
BAR THEM OR PROMOTE THEM?
Sex discrimination continues to be a serious problem in modern
society. Despite greater public awareness, commentators report that
sexism still exists in many different areas and in many different
ways.' Sometimes sex discrimination occurs subtly without much
public outcry, such as when owners of businesses offer price dis-
counts to women, but not to men. Some of these sex-based dis-
counts, however, have been the focus of lawsuits throughout-the
country. 2
For instance, in April of 1989, the Iowa Supreme Court held
that a racetrack's "Ladies' Day" promotion of admitting women free
of charge and giving them reduced prices on concessions violated
Iowa's civil rights act because it discriminated against men in the
furnishing of facilities and services. 3 This Iowa decision is the most
recent case in the nation in which male plaintiffs or administrative
agencies have accused owners of public restaurants, bars, and other
places of amusement or accommodation of denying males full and
equal enjoyment of the owners' facilities. 4 The rationale in these
cases is that owners of establishments discriminate against men by
giving women preferential pricing treatment. 5
Some earlier courts maintained that such lawsuits were trivial
because female-oriented price discounts did not harm men and
' E.g., Wolman, Verbal Sexual Harassment on the Job as Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 17 CAP. U.L. REV. '245 (1988) (workplace); Griffith, Sexism, Language, and the Law, 91
W. VA. L. REV. 125 (1988) (legal writing).
E.g., City of Clearwater v. Studebaker's Dance Club, 516 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987); Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 67 Md. App. 39, 506 A.2d 263 (1986).
' Ladd v. Iowa W. Racing Ass'n, 438 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1989).
4 See, e.g., Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 27-28, 707 P.2d 195, 196, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 133, 134 (1985); MacLean v. First N.W. Indus. of Am., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 340, 635 P.2d
683, 684 (1981). Most of the cases were brought under state public accommodation statutes.
Note, Public Accommodation Statutes: Is Ladies' Night Out?, 37 MERCER L. Rev. 1605, 1605 (1986)
(hereinafter Note, Is Ladies' Night Out?); see also Comment, The Unruh Civil Rights Act: An
Uncertain Guarantee, 31 UCLA L. REV. 443, 443-49 (1983) (hereinafter Comment, An Uncer-
tain Guarantee] (discussing state public accommodation statutes). Generally, most public ac-
commodation statutes prohibit amusement or entertainment establishments that offer goods,
services, or facilities to the public from discriminating against patrons on the basis of race,
religion, national origin, or other personal characteristics, such as sex. Id. at 443.
5 See, e.g., Ladd, 438 N.W.2d at 601 (male plaintiff); MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 340, 635
P.2d at 684 (class action suit on behalf of men).
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worked only to encourage greater female patronage The more
recent courts, however, have taken the claims seriously and have
invalidated ladies' night promotions, often noting that such schemes
injure both sexes.' Despite these more recent decisions, however,
skepticism about the importance of striking down ladies' night pro-
motions remains.8
In order to understand more clearly the issues raised in ladies'
night cases and to decide whether the cases should be taken seri-
ously, it is helpful to examine how courts and legislatures have
reacted to gender discrimination in general. Legislatures have en-
acted statutes9 and courts have chosen standards of reviewl° that
reflect the policies of these two governmental bodies regarding sex
discrimination. As courts apply these laws and standards, plaintiffs
repeatedly demand that courts give the sexes equal treatment."
6 See, e.g., Dock Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 101 Ill. App. 3d 673, 676,
428 N.E.2d 735, 738 (1981) (tavern owner's sex-based discount caused no harm to men);
Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 107 Mich. App. 398, 402-04, 309 N.W.2d 615,
618 (1981) (racquet club's reduced membership price for women did not harm men within
meaning of state statute); Magid v. Oak Park Racquet Club Assocs,, 84 Mich. App. 522, 528,
269 N.W.2d 661, 664 (1978) (same); MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 342, 348, 635 P.2d at 685, 688
(half-price charge for women at professional basketball game caused no harm to men because
claim not serious).
' See, e.g., Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 34, 707 P.2d at 201, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (price discounts
for females at bars and car washes injured both sexes); City of Clearwater v. Studebaker's
Dance Club, 516 So. 2d 1106, 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (dance club's promotion giving
women reduced prices on drinks discriminatory); Ladd, 438 N.W.2d at 602 (racetrack's
discount for women a violation of civil rights act); Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 67 Md.
App. 39, 48, 506 A.2d 263, 267-68 (1986) (deli's "Skirt and Gown Night" violation of
dramshop act); Abosh v. New York Yankees, No. CPS-25284, Appeal No. 1194 (N.Y. State
Human Rights Appeal Bd., July 19, 1972), reprinted in B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON
& S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 1069, 1070 (1975) [hereinafter BABCOCK] (New
York Yankees sex-based admission price stereotyped females); Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Bd. v. Dobrinoff, 80 Pa. Commnw. 453, 457, 471 A.2d 941, 943 (1984) (tavern's discount
for women violated anti-discrimination law).
n See Stoltz, Trivial Pursuits, STUDENT LAW., Feb. 1986, at 7 (Council member in Maryland
county where such a suit was brought stated, "I don't think there's a man on the street who
doesn't think this sort of case is ridiculous."); Comment, State Equal Rights Amendments: Models
for the Future, 1984 ARIZ. ST . L.J. 693, 702-06 [hereinafter Comment, Models for the Future]
(discussing seriousness of ladies' night claim in Washington).
9 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§, 2000a to 2000a-6 (1982) (Title II, the federal public accommo-
dation statute).
ID See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating standard of review for sex
discrimination in an equal protection context).
II E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 (1973) (plaintiff demanding that
Court strike down statute presuming that only men are breadwinners); Allyn v. Allison, 34
Cal. App. 3d 448, 450, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77, 78 (1973) (plaintiff demanding court to hold that,
like men, women should be able to register to vote without being required to disclose marital
status).
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Themes of paternalism, sexual stereotyping, and triviality of the
classification often appear in judicial opinions as the judges attempt
to mold policies regarding equality of the sexes. 12 A specialsituation
exists when males or representatives for males, such as administra-
tive bodies, are initiating the gender discrimination suits on behalf
of men, because men do not share the same history of discrimina-
tion that women do.' 3 Again, the issue reverts back to what sorts of
classifications courts should invalidate.
This note explores whether the social consequences of allowing
gender-based pricing schemes to continue are trivial or serious, and
whether courts should invalidate such pricing schemes. Section I
provides an overview of gender discrimination, focusing on the
policies and themes surrounding this type of discrimination." Part
A briefly examines some of the congressional statutes on discrimi-
nation, as well as the Supreme Court's standard of review in gender
discrimination cases.' 5 Part B examines three recurring themes in
gender discrimination cases: paternalism, sexual stereotypes, and
triviality. 16 Part C focuses on the judicial reaction to male-initiated
gender discrimination suits.' Section 1 does not provide a compre-
hensive historical account of the law, but rather emphasizes some
of the policies and themes surrounding gender discrimination in
order to build a foundation for a later discussion of ladies' night
cases.
Next, section II examines some of the more recent ladies' night
cases. 18 Part A focuses on the reasoning of some courts holding that
sex-based price discounts are legal. 1 ° Part B identifies the reasoning
of the courts holding that ladies' night promotions constitute illegal
sex discrimination. 2°
Finally, section III of this note analyzes the ladies' night cases
in light of the policies and themes examined in section 1. 2 ' This
note will conclude that courts should continue the trend of striking
down gender-based promotions, even where the disparities in price
12 See infra notes 46-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of these themes.
12 See infra notes 83-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of male-initiated
lawsuits.
14 See infra notes 22-117 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 22-45 and accompanying text.
It' See infra notes 46-82 and accompanying text.
U2 See infra notes 83-106 and accompanying text
12 See infra notes 118-218 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 131-173 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 174-218 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 219-275 and accompanying text.
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that owners charge male and female patrons are small. Although
ladies' night promoters appear to treat females favorably, they ac-
tually encourage paternalism toward women and stereotypical atti-
tudes about both men and women. Under the states' broadly-
worded sex discrimination statutes, sex-based discounts must fail.
In short, this note demonstrates that singleLsex price discounts dis-
advantage both males and females and, as such, both sexes should
contribute to prohibiting the business practice.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Both the courts and legislatures have developed policies in
handling gender discrimination. Congressional statutes and the Su-
preme Court's standard of review shed light on the traditional
treatment of gender discrimination as opposed to other forms of
discrimination. In addition, examining recurring themes in gender
discrimination cases, such as paternalism, sexual stereotypes, and
triviality or seriousness of the violation, further clarifies societal
attitudes surrounding equality of the sexes. The judicial response
to male plaintiffs in gender discrimination suits is also an issue
because this response may influence our own ideas of which gender
classifications need to be invalidated.
A. Legislative. and Judicial Responses
Twenty-six years ago, the United States Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "Act"). 22 Congress designed Title II
of the Act to combat discrimination in enumerated places of public
accommodation." Under the statute, discrimination is prohibited if
based upon race, color, religion, or national origin. 24 Title II allows
owners of certain public establishments to treat the sexes differently,
22 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h(6) (1982).
25 Id. at §§ 2000a to 2000a-6. Title II states in part, All persons shall be entitled to the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accom-
modations of any place of public accommodation ... without discrimination or segregation
on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." Id. at § 2000a.
Title II defines a place of public accommodation to include establishments that provide
lodging for transient guests, facilities that sell food for consumption on the premises, gas
stations, places of exhibition or entertainment, and any establishment located in or within
the premises of any other covered establishment and that holds itself out to serve patrons of
that covered establishment. Id. at § 2000a(b)(1)—(4).
24 Id. at § 2000a.
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however, without fear of retaliation. 25 One author explained that
this omission was due to the low consciousness level of sex bias, and
because at the time the Act was passed, most of the exclusions from
public accommodations were based on race. 26 In addition, Title Vii
of the Act prohibits discrimination in employment. 27 Title VII pros-
cribes discrimination based on sex as well as other classifications. 28
Southern legislators, however, added the word "sex" to the bill
mainly to defeat the bill's enactment. 2°
The state legislators' responses to discrimination, on the other
hand, have not always paralleled the United States Congress. Many
of the states that have public accommodation statutes, the state
counterparts to Title II, do consider sex discrimination to be illegal
under their acts. 3° In many states, broadly-phrased statutes mandate
that owners of public restaurants and bars, for example, treat male
and female patrons equally. 3 ' In addition, several states have passed
equal rights amendments to their state constitutions requiring equal
treatment of the sexes. 32
In addition to legislatures, the United States Supreme Court
has also played a role in the struggle to erase gender discrimination.
Until 1976, the Supreme Court measured discrimination using one
of only two standards of review. 33 One standard, the rational basis
test, requires only that the challenged law or governmental action
bear a rational relation to a valid state purpose to pass constitutional
26 See id. (does not include sex as a protected category); DeCrow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp.,
288 F. Supp. 530, 532 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that sex discrimination is not illegal under
Title II).
26 See BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 1037.
2, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1981).
28 Id.
28 Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 404 n.4 (6th Cir. 1977) (McCree, J.,
dissenting); see also Note, Sexual Harassment and Tide VII—A Better Solution, 30 B.C.L. REV.
1071, 1076 (1989) (discussing last minute addition of sex as protected category under Title
VII).
68 BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 1037; see infra note 174 (discussing Massachusetts adding
"sex" to its public accommodation statute).
61 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.7 (West 1988) (stating that it is unlawful for "any
owner . of any public accommodation . ... deny to any person because of . sex
... the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges thereof ... ."); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (Supp. 1989) (stating that the protection against sex discrimi-
nation "shall include, but not be limited to:... Mlle right to the full enjoyment of any of
the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accom-
modation, assemblage, or amusement . .").
62 Comment, Models for the Future, supra note 8, at 695 n.12 (listing 16 states with ERAs
as of 1984).
66 See Sager, Some Observations About Race, Sex, and Equal Protection, 59 Tut,. L. Rev. 928,
928-29 (1985).
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muster. 34 Under this test, government action is rarely unconstitu-
tional. On the other end of the spectrum, the Supreme Court
applies strict scrutiny to certain laws and regulations, a standard
that prohibits classifications unless necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. 35 Groups entitled to this, the strictest of scrutiny, are
considered "suspect" classes." The Supreme Court considers clas-
sifications based on race and national origin to be suspect and thus
applies strict scrutiny to them."
Unprecedented, the United States Supreme Court in the 1976
case of Craig v. Boren chose to apply a third standard of review to
sex discrimination cases, the intermediate test." In Craig, the Su-
preme Court held that an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of
3.2% beer to males under twenty-one, although allowing females
eighteen and above to purchase the beer, violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment." The Court, in applying
an "intermediate" test, noted that to withstand constitutional chal-
lenge, the gender classification in a statute must further important
governmental purposes and be substantially related to meeting
those purposes." In Craig, the Court rejected the state's argument
that the statute furthered the objective of increasing traffic safety.
As such, the Court held that under the intermediate test, the statute
unconstitutionally discriminated against eighteen- to twenty-year-
old males.
In short, courts and legislatures have established policies to
handle gender discrimination. For example, under Title II, federal
courts prohibit some forms of discrimination in places of public
accommodation, but not if it is based on sex.'" Some states, however,
do proscribe sex discrimination under their public accommodation
statutes. 42 In addition, some states have passed equal rights amend-
ments mandating equal treatment of the sexes in all areas.'" Finally,
the Supreme Court has chosen to review sex discrimination cases
" See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 548 U.S. 483,488 (1955).
35 See Sager, supra note 33, at 928-29.
36 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-25, at 1558 (2d ed. 1988).
37 Id.
'8 429 U.S. 190,197 (1976).
" Id. at 210,
40 Id. at 197.
4 ' See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of Title II.
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of states adding sex as
a protected category.
59 See .supra note 32 and accompanying text for a discussion of state ERAs.
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with an intermediate test." This standard of review is more intense
than the rational basis test; the Supreme Court, however, does not
subject sex discrimination to the highest level of review, strict scru-
tiny." After deciding which level of scrutiny to accord gender cases,
courts still struggle with devising a solution for the recurring prob-
lems that surround differential treatment of the sexes.
B. Recurring Themes in Gender Discrimination Cases: Paternalism,
Sexual Stereotypes, and Triviality
Through the fourteenth amendment, as well as federal and
state statutes, plaintiffs have attacked gender discrimination in
many areas of society. Some courts, when hearing these cases, ex-
press concern about justifying special treatment for women based
on the view that women are weak or needy of protection." Often,
this paternalism is intertwined with sexual stereotyping inherent in
so-called favorable treatment.'" In addition, another issue that trou-
bles many courts is whether they should distinguish between serious
and trivial infractions by being more inclined to uphold the latter."
Courts, therefore, have often faced the recurring themes of
paternalism and stereotyping when hearing gender discrimination
cases. One case addressing the stereotype that only husbands are
the breadwinners is the 1973 case of Frontiero v. Richardson." In
Frontiero, the United States Supreme Court held that statutes pres-
uming that spouses of male members of the military were depen-
dents of their husbands, but not vice versa, violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment as incorporated
through the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 5° In Fron-
tiero, a married female Air Force officer applied for increased ben-
efits for her husband, claiming him as a dependent. The Air Force
denied her application because the appellant did not demonstrate
that her husband depended on her for more than fifty percent of
his support.
44 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the intermediate
test.
4 See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rational basis
and strict scrutiny tests.
46 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
" See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir.
1969).
46 See, e.g., Allyn v. Allison, 34 Cal. App. 3d 448, 454, 110 Cal. Rpm 77, 80-81 (1973)
(Roth, J., concurring).
49 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
99 Id. at 690-91.
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The Supreme Court rejected the administrative convenience
argument that the district court relied on to uphold the statute.
The district court had reasoned that because husbands were gen-
erally the breadwinners in the family, administrative economy jus-
tified the presumption of dependency for male spouses, but not
female spouses. 5 ' In its reasoning, the Frontiero Court established
that it wished to avoid furthering such sexual stereotypes because
"[t]raditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude
of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not
on a pedestal, but in a cage." 52 Thus, the Court concluded that
statutes presuming that only the spouses of male military members
were dependents violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment as incorporated through the due process clause
of the fifth amendment.
Another common stereotype courts have addressed in many
cases is the paternalistic notion that women are weak and in need
of protection. For example, courts at one time upheld statutes ex-
cluding women from establishments selling liquor based on the
rationale that such laws protected women and enforced high mor-
als." Historically, paternalism also abounded in the area of employ-
ment." After the passage of Title VII, however, courts began strik-
ing down sex-based restrictions in employment." Courts have
invalidated protectionist laws and rules such as sex-based weight-
lifting restrictions," sex-based hours limitations," and male-only
job categories.58
One such employment decision invalidating a protectionist
practice was the 1969 case of Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone &
51 Id. at 681-82.
52 Id. at 684.
" See, e.g., Hoboken v. Greiner, 68 N.J.L. 592, 593-94, 53 A. 693, 693 (1902) (ordinance
valid that prohibited saloon keeper from permitting females from gathering in establishment
for purpose of enticing customers) (overruled by Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n v.
Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 189, 270 A.2d 628, 633 (1970)); Laughlin v. Tillamook County, 75
Or. 506, 508, 147 P. 547, 548 (1915) (ordinance valid that prohibited liquor licensee from
permitting women to visit, frequent, or loiter in place of business selling liquor).
" See BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 247-82 (discussing history of "protective" state labor
laws).
55 See id. at 268-82.	 '
" See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 712 (7th Cir. 1969); Richards
v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D. Or. 1969); Rosenfeld v. Southern Par.
Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219, 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
" See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 (S.D. Ill. 1970).
5' See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969)
(switchman).
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Telegraph Co. 59 In Weeks, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that offering a switchman's position exclusively
to men violated Title VII. 60 The plaintiff, Mrs. Weeks, applied for
the switchman's position, but Southern Bell responded with a letter
stating that it had decided not to offer the position to women.61
Instead, Southern Bell gave the job to a less senior male employee,
the only other applicant, despite the contract terms with Weeks
which stated that the senior bidder, if qualified, would get the job.
Southern Bell contended that the switchman's job was too strenuous
for women.
The Weeks court, however, rejected Southern Bell's argument,
noting that simply labeling a position strenuous was not enough to
justify the sex-based classification. 62 In effect, the Weeks court dis-
puted the stereotyped characterization that women could not lift
thirty pounds without harming themselves or others. 63 Reasoning
that the real harm in situations similar to Weeks is that employers
deny women access to higher paying and more desirable positions,
the court rejected adhering to Victorian, paternalistic justifications
for keeping women at their present employment levels. 64 The Weeks
court thus held that denying the switchman's position to females
violated Title Vii.
Another theme recurring in gender discrimination cases is the
suggestion that some types of discrimination are too trivial to merit
concern. Triviality was a factor in the 1973 case of Allyn v. Allison. 65
In Allyn, the California Court of Appeal held that a code provision
w See id.
6° Id,
61 Id. at 230. The switchman's job description read as follows:
Engaged in the maintenance and operation of dial central office equipment,
test, power, frame, switch, and other telephone equipment, including the locat-
ing and correcting of faults; making adjustments, additions, repairs, and re-
placements; performing routine operation tests, etc., and working with test-
desk, field, and other forces connected with central office work. Also operates
and maintains, including adjusting and making repairs to or replacement of,
air conditioning equipment, and performing other work ,as assigned in accor-
dance with local circumstances and the current needs of the business.
Id. at 232.
62 Id. at 234.
" See id. at 235-36.
64 Id, at 236. The court noted that men were never denied the opportunity to receive
more pay by accepting "strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, boring or unromantic" jobs. Id.
Title VII mandates that women have that equal choice, the court concluded. Id.
65 See Allyn v. Allison, 34 Cal. App. 3d 448, 454, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77, 80-81 (1973) (Roth,
J., concurring); Karst, "A Discrimination So Trivial": A Note on Law and the Symbolism of Women's
Dependency, 49 L.A.B. BULL. 499 (1974) (critical discussion of this case),
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requiring females to register to vote using the designation "Miss"
or "Mrs.," but exempting males from indicating their marital status,
did not violate the California constitution. 66 In Allyn, two women
attempted to register using "Ms.," but the Registrar of Voters re-
fused to accept and process their registrations. The majority rea-
soned that the provision did not impair the women's right to vote.
The court further reasoned that requiring women to register as
"Miss" or "Mrs." was reasonable because it furthered the govern-
mental objective of preventing double voting. 67 The Allyn court also
noted that a woman is not disadvantaged by disclosing her marital
status because this information is of public record.
A concurring opinion noted that if marital status is important
to registration, then both males and females should be asked to
state if they are married." The concurring judge argued, however,
that the differential treatment in question was so trivial that he was
not willing to correct the problem through judicial means, but
rather, would give the legislature the first opportunity to do so. 69
Thus, the Allyn court held that the statute did not violate the equal
protection clause.
Similarly, another example of a case in which a court main-
tained that a sex-based classification was trivial was the 1977 case of
Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co." In Barker, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that an employer's grooming
code mandating shorter hair for males than females did not violate
Title VII. 7 ' The defendant, an amusement park, discharged Barker,
66 Allyn, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The plaintiffs also brought a claim
under the nineteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
67 Id. at 452, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The court stated that the designation "Mrs." indicates
that a woman might have previously used a different name when voting. Thus, using "Mrs."
would be helpful in assuring that the old registrations are cancelled, and that no one votes
twice. The court mentioned that male names, however, do not change after marriage and,
therefore, it is unnecessary for them to use any designation at all. Id. at 452, 110 Cal. Rptr.
at 80.
6' Id. at 453, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (Roth, J., concurring).
69 Id. at 454, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81 (Roth, J., concurring). Justice Roth stated:
[Tihe difference complained of . . . has had so little effect upon the allegedly
wronged party, that even though it could be probably whipped and beaten into
constitutional proportions, I cannot engender sufficient provocation to attempt
to correct through the judicial process a discrimination so trivial without giving
the first opportunity to the Legislature to satisfy all those truly interested.
Id.
The California legislature did later pass a bill correcting this situation. Karst, supra note
65, at 499.
7" See Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977).
71 Id.
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a male artist-craftsman, for having long hair. The Barker court noted
that upholding the hair length regulation would comport with the
decisions of the other appeals courts that had considered the issue.
The Barker court maintained that employer hair length regu-
lations bore such a "negligible relation" to Title VII's purposes that
the code could not be what Congress intended to invalidate. 72 In
attempting to determine the legislative purposes of the statute, the
court concluded that in the absence of a clear expression of the
legislature's intent, courts should not infer that Congress intended
to strike down something other than traditional discrimination."
Reasoning that regulating hair length is not traditionally regarded
as discriminatory, the Barker court held that the employer's regu-
lation did not violate Title VII. 74
The dissent, however, argued that courts should grant great
deference to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
which has consistently ruled that in most situations, hair regulations
are illegal under Title VII." The dissent also argued that the ma-
jority failed to explain adequately why sex-based grooming codes
would not be discriminatory. The dissent further noted that when
analyzing a Title VII case, the United States Supreme Court does
not distinguish between the subjective significance or insignificance
of the characteristic being regulated, in this case, hair length, and
that therefore, the majority in Barker had no authority to make such
distinctions." Finally, the dissent maintained that, in any event, hair
length is not a de minimis characteristic. Rather, the dissent argued
that hair length reflects individual choice and, in that respect, in-
dividuals place great value in maintaining control over their hair-
styles." The dissent, therefore, unsuccessfully argued that sex-based
hair length regulations violated Title VI1. 78
In summary, many courts, when hearing sex discrimination
cases, face recurring claims of stereotyping and paternalistic atti-
tudes toward one sex. 79 In addition, some courts uphold lesser
72 Id.
73 Id. at 401-02 (citing General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145 (1976)).
74 Id. at 401.
75 Id. at 403 (McCree, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 404 (McCree, J., dissenting) (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S.
542 (1971)).
77 Id. at 405 (McCree, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 402-05 (McCree, J., dissenting).
79 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (discussing the pedestal-
turned-into-cage problem); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36
(1969) (rejecting stereotype that women cannot hold a switchman's job).
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violations of sex discrimination.80 These courts may not view the
violations as being so serious that they require judicial correction."
Also, courts may question whether the legislature intended to in-
validate what society has not historically considered to be discrimi-
nation.82 Many courts, therefore, look at paternalism, sexual stereo-
typing, and the seriousness of the discrimination before deciding
whether to strike it down.
C. Male-Initiated Gender Discrimination Suits
Commentators have debated the issue of whether men are just
as deserving as females of winning sex discrimination cases." Some
courts choose to strike down only discrimination against women
because of women's past history of being disadvantaged." Other
courts view equal protection as inuring to both sexes, despite the
divergent female-male history."
One male-initiated lawsuit with an unfavorable ruling for the
male plaintiff was the 1981 case of Michael M. v. Superior Court." In
Michael M., a five-member majority of the United States Supreme
Court upheld over an equal protection challenge California's sta-
tutory rape law, which only incriminated male actors." The plain-
tiff, Michael M., was a seventeen-year-old male who had had sexual
relations with a sixteen-year-old female. Michael M. appealed his
statutory rape conviction on the theory that the statute unconsti-
tutionally discriminated against men because they alone were crim-
inally liable under the act. 88 All three levels of California state courts
upheld the statute." .
In its reasoning, the majority in Michael M. noted that the basis
of the case was discrimination against men. The Michael M. Court
stated that although males were burdened under the statute, they
were not in need of the Court's protection because men as a group
8° See, e.g., Barker, 549 F.2d at 405 (upheld employer male-only hair length regulation);
Allyn v. Allison, 34 Cal. App. 3d 448, 453, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77, 80 (1973) (upheld law requiring
women to use "Miss" or "Mrs." when registering to vote).
81 E.g., Allyn, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 454, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81 (Roth, J., concurring).
88 E.g., Barker, 549 F.2d at 401-02.
88 See, e.g., Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme
Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265, 299 (1984).
" See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1981).
" See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979).
86 450 U.S. at 476.
87 Id.
819 Id. at 466-67.
89 Id. at 467.
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had not suffered from historical sexual discrimination or past dis-
advantages." Thus, the majority held that the statutory rape law
did not violate the equal protection clause.
On the other hand, in the 1979 case, Orr v. Orr, the male
plaintiff received a favorable verdict. 91 In Orr, the United States
Supreme Court held that an Alabama statute providing that hus-
bands, but not wives, be required to pay alimony after divorce
violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.92 Upon divorce, the probate court ordered Mr. Orr to pay his
ex-wife alimony. Two years later, the ex-wife brought contempt
charges against Orr alleging nonpayment. Orr defended by arguing
that Alabama's alimony statute was unconstitutional because it al-
lowed courts to order the ex-husband to pay alimony, but not the
ex-wife. The Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama, decided against
Orr. After the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals sustained the lower
court's holding and the Alabama Supreme Court quashed its earlier
grant of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and reversed. 93
In holding that the statute violated the equal protection clause,
the Orr Court maintained that it must review discrimination against
men with the same intermediate test that it applies for discrimina-
tion against women." As such, the Court examined three govern-
mental objectives that the state might have arguably advanced for
the differential alimony policy. First, the Court agreed with Orr
that the state may have been announcing its preference for a de-
pendent female role in the family. 95 The Orr Court rejected this
objective due to the reality that women were no longer destined to
spend their lives at home rearing a family. 95 A second objective, the
Court surmised, might have been to provide aid to needy spouses
upon divorce, whereupon the state used the female sex as a proxy
for need.'" Third, the Court noted another possible goal of com-
pensating ex-wives for discrimination that they may have suffered
during marriage, which made them unprepared to cross over to
the job market upon divorce. 98 The Court recognized the validity
'° Id.
9 ' 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
" Id. at 283.
95 Id. at 271.
"4 Id. at 272.
95 id. at 279.
99 Id. at 280.
97 Id.
9" Id.
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of the latter two objectives but held that, under the statute, even if
women were needy or discriminated against in marriage, individual
hearings that identified the relative financial statuses of the husband
and wife were already occurring." The Court thus reasoned that
determining if a spouse needs alimony was an insubstantial burden
on the state, unjustified by any of the possible objectives behind
enacting the law.'°°
Finally, the Orr Court discussed legislative classifications that
favor one gender, but burden another.'°' The Court supported a
view that these classifications carry the risk of reinforcing stereo-
types regarding women's proper place or need of protection.'° 2
Thus, the Orr Court reasoned that even a statute designed to com-
pensate women for past discrimination must be carefully tailored
to determine if gender-neutral distinctions, such as need, could
instead be used as a stepping stone to an appropriate state pur-
pose.'" Therefore, the Court held that Alabama's law granting
courts the authority to require men to pay alimony, but not women,
violated the equal protection clause.
Summarizing, some courts hold that protection against sex dis-
crimination should inure to women more than to men. 1 °4 These
courts recognize burdens to males, yet still uphold sex-based clas-
sifications that favor women over men. 1 °5 Other courts, however,
regard sex discrimination against males to be just as deserving of
court invalidation. 106
In conclusion, several policy issues and themes surround gen-
der discrimination cases. Under federal law, Congress has decided
not to protect the sexes from discrimination in places of public
accommodation under Title II; several state legislatures, however,
have extended such protection in their Title II counterparts.'°7
99 Id. at 280-281.
1" Id. at 281.
See id. at 283.
102 Id.
'°' Id.
L04 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464,475-76 (1981) (Court reasoned
that men needed protection less than women). See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Michael M.
'" See, e.g., Michael M., 450 U.S. at 476.
1 °" See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,279 (1979) (Court reasoned that both men and
women should he protected from discrimination equally). See supra notes 91-103 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Orr.
1 "7 See supra notes 23-25,30-31 and accompanying text for an overview of state and
federal public accommodation statutes.
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Similarly, some individual states have also passed equal rights
amendments to their state constitutions, aiming to combat sex dis-
crimination.'" As for standards of review in gender discrimination
cases, the United States Supreme Court has determined that courts
should use an intermediate standard of review rather than the
strictest of reviews when hearing equal protection cases. 103
While analyzing gender discrimination cases, many courts have
addressed stereotyping and paternalistic attitudes toward one sex,
as well as whether distinctions should be made between trivial or
serious infractions of the law."° Some courts avoid paternalistic or
protectionist attitudes toward one sex."' In addition, the judiciary
sometimes acknowledges that the furtherance of sexual stereotypes
should constitute discrimination." 2 Other courts, however, do
not." 3 In addition, some courts will distinguish subjectively between
major and minor sex discrimination by upholding the latter.'"
Finally, policies about whether males as well as females should
be protected from gender discrimination may vary. k 5 Courts may
reason that men as a class do not need the court's protection because
only women have been the historical victims of sex discrimination." 6
Other courts, however, have combatted sex discrimination against
men as well."' In short, courts considering how to handle gentler
discrimination cases address a multitude of issues before deciding
whether to strike down a certain classification.
'"" See Comment, Models for the Future, supra note 8, at 695 n.12 (listing the sixteen states
with ERAs as of 1984).
" See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the equal protection
standards of review.
11" See supra notes 46-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of paternalism,
stereotyping, and triviality.
in See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of paternalism and
gender discrimination.
"2 See id.
IIS See supra notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text discussing courts nut willing to reject
stereotypes.
114 See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of triviality and gender
discrimination.
115 See supra notes 83-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of male-initiated
gender suits.
"6 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464,476 (1981) (Court reasoned
that men needed protection less than women). See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Michael M.
17 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,279 (1979) (majority of justices reasoned that both
men and women should be protected from discrimination equally). See supra notes 91-103
and accompanying text for a discussion of Orr.
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II. CHALLENGES TO LADIES' NIGHT PRICE DISCOUNTS
Plaintiffs have challenged gender-based promotions or "ladies'
nights" in a number of settings, including sporting events," 8 bars
and nightclubs," 9 restaurants, 12° and car washes.' 2 ' In several early
cases, courts held that the ladies' night promotions did not violate
any state law.' 22 Some of the courts reasoned that the discounts did
not harm men under the sex discrimination statutes.'" They also
noted the minor deviations in price charged to men and women
when upholding the discounts.' 24 Recognizing a valid business pur-
pose in encouraging female patronage, the courts denied verdicts
for _the men because the owners had not discouraged the men from
patronizing the establishments and had not made the men feel
unsolicited. 125
E.g., Ladd v. Iowa W. Racing Ass'n, 438 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 1989) (racetrack);
Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 107 Mich. App. 398, 399, 309 N.W.2d 615, 617
(1981) (racquet club); Magid v. Oak Park Racquet Club Assocs., 84 Mich. App. 522, 524, 269
N.W.2d 661, 662 (1978) (same); Abosh v. New York Yankees, No. CPS-25284, Appeal No.
1194 (N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., July 19, 1972), reprinted in BABCOCK, supra note
7, at 1069-70 (baseball stadium); MacLean v. First N.W. Indus. of Am., 96 Wash. 2d 338,
340, 635 P.2d 683, 684 (1981) (basketball arena).
19 E.g., Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 27, 707 P.2d 195, 195, 219 Cal. Rptr.
133, 133-34 (1985) (bar); City of Clearwater v. Studebaker's Dance Club, 516 So. 2d 1106,
1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (dance club); Dock Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control
Comm'n, 101 III. App. 3d 673, 673, 428 N.E.2d 735. 736 (1981) (tavern); Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Bd. v. Dobrinoff, 80 Pa. Commnw. 453, 454-55, 471 A.2d 941, 942 (1984)
(tavern).
' 2° E.g., Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 67 Md. App. 39, 41, 506 A.2d 263, 264 (1986)
(delicatessen).
121 E.g., Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 27, 707 P.2d at 195, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34 (car washes).
122 See, e.g., Dock Club, 101 III. App. 3d at 677, 428 N.E.2d at 738 (sex-based discount
did not violate civil rights portion of Illinois dramshop act); Tucich, 107 Mich. App. at 402-
03, 309 N.W.2d at 618 (sex-based discount did not violate Michigan's public accommodation
statute); Magid, 84 Mich. App. at 528, 269 N.W.2d at 664 (same); MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at
343, 347-48, 635 P.2d at 685, 687-88 (sex-based discount did not violate Washington's anti-
discrimination law or its ERA).
125 E.g., Dock Club, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 676, 428 N.E.2d at 738; MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d
at 342, 635 P.2d at 685.
124 See, e.g., Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 164 Cal. App. 3d 298, 209 Cal. Rptr. 233, 234-
35 (1984) (court referred to ladies' night promotion as "merely preferred treatment for
women . . . in the form of petty price discounts"), rev'd, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 707 P.2d 195, 219
Cal. Rptr. 133 (1985); MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 340, 635 P.2d at 684 (court noted that women
paid $230 for admission, while men paid $5.00). But see Tucich, 107 Mich. App. at 400, 309
N.W.2d at 617 (price difference for membership at racquet club amounted to twenty dollars).
'" See, e.g., Dock Club, 101 III. App. 3d at 676-77, 428 N.E.2d at 738 (discount upheld
because owners did not exact men's higher price in order to discourage men from patronizing
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Later courts, however, rejected the reasoning that such dis-
counts were trivial and justified by profit potential. 126 These courts
held that ladies' night promotions violated state anti-discrimination
laws by denying males equal treatment in places of public amuse-
ment.' 27 Part of the reason for this trend is that courts recognize
both financial and psychological harm to the male plaintiffs under
the statutes.' 28 Also, some courts have demonstrated that upholding
ladies' nights perpetuates dangerous sexual stereotypes such as men
being the breadwinners, or women being sex objects. 129 Finally,
courts striking down the discounts fear the repercussions of judges
incorporating their subjective views into the standard for sex dis-
crimination.' 3° These courts foresee that allowing the discounts to
continue will result in additional exceptions to statutes proscribing
establishment, nor did it have that effect); Tucich, 107 Mich. App. at 402, 309 N.W.2d at 618
(discount upheld because owners did not withhold, refuse, or deny accommodations to men);
Magid, 84 Mich. App. at 528, 269 N.W.2d at 664 (same); MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 344, 635
P.2d at 686 (discounts upheld because they were not calculated to cause male plaintiff to feel
unwelcome or unaccepted).
226 See, e.g., Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 39, 707 P.2d 195, 204, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 133, 142 (1985). • -
1 Y 7 See id. at 39, 707 P.2d at 204, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 142 (sex-based discounts violated
California's public accommodation statute); City of Clearwater v. Studebaker's Dance Club,
516 So. 2d 1106, 1108-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (sex-based discount violated Clearwater
city ordinance); Ladd v. Iowa W. Racing Ass'n, 438 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1989) (sex-based
discount violated Iowa's civil rights act); Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 67 Md. App. 39,
48, 506 A.2d 263, 267-68 (1986) (sex-based discount violated Montgomery county anti-
discrimination law); Abosh v. New York Yankees, No. CPS-25284, Appeal No. 1194 (N.Y.
State Human Rights Appeal 13d., July 19, 1972), reprinted in BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 1070
(sex-based discount violated New York human relations law); Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Bd. v. Dobrinoff, SO Pa. Commnw, 453, 457, 471 A.2d 941, 943 (1984) (sex-based discount
violated Pennsylvania Human Relations Act).
' 26 See, e.g., Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 34, 707 P.2d at 200, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39 (court
pointed to economic injury to male plaintiff, as well as discount's effect of making plaintiff
feel unfairly treated); Peppin, 67 Md. App. at 46, 506 A.2d at 266 (court held half-price
discount on food placed significant burden upon men).
'" See, e.g., Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 34-35, 707 P.2d at 201-02, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40
(discussing how ladies' nights further stereotypes); Abash, No. CPS-25284, Appeal No. 1194
(N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., July 19, 1972), reprinted in BABCOCK, supra note 7, at
1070 (discusses female stereotypes surrounding ladies' day at New York Yankees baseball
games).
ISO 	 e.g., Ladd, 438 N.W.2d at 602 ("[Wle .. do not believe ... a de minimis exception
for discrimination is viable. Nor does the statute suggest we should attempt to make such
distinctions."); Peppin, 67 Md. App. at 43, 506 A.2d at 265 ("We believe the matter involves
an intrinsically substantive issue which, left unanswered, could serve to encourage far more
serious methods of discrimination.").
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sex discrimination, resulting in the maintenance of inequality be-
tween sexes in our society.
A. Cases Permitting Sex-Based Discounts
Many early decisions held that sex-based discounts do not con-
stitute sex discrimination under state statutes."' These decisions
recognized the validity of businesses using price discounts to en-
courage female attendance, as long as the discounts do not at the
same time discourage male patronage.' 32 The courts also noted the
trivial differences in male versus female prices and concluded that
men are not victims of discrimination,'"
One such ladies' day case was the 1981 decision of MacLean v.
First Northwest Industries of America.' 34 In MacLean, the Supreme
Court of Washington held that management's practice of admitting
females at half-price on Sundays to Seattle Supersonic basketball
games did not violate either Washington's anti-discrimination law
or its equal rights amendment ("ERA")."5 In MacLean, the male
01 See infra notes 134-173 and accompanying text.
"2 E.g., Dock Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 101 III. App. 3d 673, 676—
77, 428 N.E.2d 735, 738 (1981) (owners did not exact men's higher price in order to
discourage men from patronizing establishment, nor did it have that effect, so discount
upheld).
"s E.g., MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 340, 635 P.2d
684, 688 (1981) (court noted that women paid $2.50 for admission, while men paid $5.00).
1 " Id.
' 3' Id. at 343, 347-48, 635 P.2d at 685, 687-88. Washington's law against discrimination
provides:
(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of . . . sex • .. is recognized
as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited
to:
(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation,
assemblage, or amusement . .
WASH: REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (Sapp. 1989).
The statute defines "full enjoyment" as follows:
"Full enjoyment of" includes the right to purchase any service, commodity,
or article of personal property offered or sold on, or by, any establishment to
the public, and the admission of any person to accommodations, advantages,
facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage,
or amusement, without acts directly or indirectly causing persons of any partic-
ular ... sex . . . to be treated as not welcome, accepted, desired, or solicited.
Id. at § 49.60.040.
At the time of the MacLean case, this definition did not include "sex" as a protected
category. The MacLean court, however, read "sex" into the provision to make it consistent
with section 49,60.030(1)(b), which did give the right of full enjoyment in these places of
public assemblage or amusement to members of both sexes. See MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at
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plaintiff requested, and was denied, the females' half-price admis-
sion charge of $2.50 at a basketball game in the Seattle Coliseum. 136
MacLean filed suit in the Superior Court of King County, Washing-
ton, alleging that the sex-based price discount violated a Washington
statute against discrimination.' 37 The superior court dismissed the
action on a motion for summary judgment and refused to allow an
amendment to the complaint alleging a violation of Washington's
ERA. 138 The court of appeals, reaching the ERA issue on its own
initiative, held that the promotion violated the Washington ERA. 139
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the appeals court
decision and held that the sex-based discount did not violate the
ERA or the state anti-discrimination statute. 140 The MacLean court
determined that management did not intend to discriminate against
men in a men's professional basketball arena, a place the court
called a "citadel of masculine dominance." 141 The court emphasized
that First Northwest Industries (FNI) offered several other pricing
promotions in addition to ladies' night, and that the men who were
required to pay the regular prices were just those men who did not
fall into any of these special pricing categories. 142 Also important to
the MacLean court was the lack of evidence that other men shared
MacLean's disgruntlement.' 43 Thus, the court concluded that FNI's
pricing schemes did not discriminate on the basis of sex.
To support its holding, the Supreme Court of Washington
determined that, because the ticket policy did increase attendance,
343, 635 P.2d at 685. The court reasoned that the omission of any reference to sex in section
49.060.040 was inadvertent. Id.
338 MacLean, 96 Wash. 2c1 at 390, 635 P.2d at 684.
A number of student authors have discussed MacLean. See Comment, Models for the
Future, supra note 8, at 702-06; Note, Is Ladies' Night Out?, supra note 4, at 1605-10; Note,
Washington's Equal Rights Amendment and Law Against Discrimination—The Approval of the Seattle
Sonics'"Ladies' Night", 58 WASH. L. Rev. 465 (1985); Survey of Washington Law, i7 GONZ. L.
REV. 913 (1982); Survey of Washington Law, 15 GONZ, L. REV. 1093 (1980); Recent Developments,
Gender Discrimination—The ERA v. "Ladies Night," One State's Perspective, 15 TULSA L.J. 366
(1979).
137 MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 340, 635 P.2d at 684.
338 Id. at 340-41, 635 P.2d at 684.
°' Id. at 341, 635 P.2d at 684 (citing MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., 24
Wash. App. 161, 600 P.2d 1027 (1979)).
140 Id.
Hi Id. at 346, 635 P.2d at 687.
142 Id. at 341-42, 635 P.2d at 687. The other groups given lower admission prices were
senior citizens, military members, students, low-income citizens, and groups of 30 or more.
Id.
343 Id. at 347, 635 P.2d at 687. The court referred to an affidavit stating that a "sizable
majority" approved of promotional programs such as ladies' night. Id.
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a business purpose justified the continuance of the ladies' night
promotion.'" Noting that women are not as interested in basketball
as men, the MacLean court reasoned that the defendants had a valid
business reason for attracting female attendance with discounts and
other special programs aimed at women. 145 The court also pointed
out that the regular ticket price of $5.00 FNI charged to male
spectators was reasonable and fair, considering the high cost of
paying quality professional basketball players. 146
The court also noted that MacLean had not shown that he
suffered any damage due to the special discount for women. Em-
phasizing that Washington is a community property state, the
MacLean court reasoned that MacLean, because he was married and
had paid for his wife's ticket, actually benefited from the pricing
schemes.'47 The court further stated that had MacLean purchased
the tickets out of his separate funds, he still would not have been
damaged because he would be in a better financial position than if
women had not been admitted at half-price.'" Finally, the court
maintained that even if the plaintiff had attended the game alone
or with other males, he again would not have been injured because
the financial benefit would have been open to him at his option had
he chosen to invite a female companion. 149
' 44 See id. at 342, 635 P.2d at 684-85.
15 Id. at 342, 635 P.2d at 684. Women constituted only 35% of the spectators before
FNI introduced the program. Id. The other attractions for women included Seattle Symphony
performances before the game and at half-time, women's fashion shows and basketball
shooting at half-time, and the sale of gifts and souvenirs. Id. at 342, 635 P.2d at 685.
]16
"7 Id. at 342-43, 635 P.2d at 685. Two justices in dissent disputed the majority's holding
that the respondent suffered no harm. See id. at 352, 635 P.2d at 690 (Utter, J., dissenting);
id. at 355, 635 P.2d at 691-92 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). Justice Utter reminded the court that
no actual damage to the plaintiff need be shown because Washington's statute provides that
gender discrimination can be per se injurious. Id. at 351, 635 P.2d at 690 (Utter, J., dissenting).
This is so, he noted, because the preamble states that discrimination injures not only the
victim but the state and public as well. Id. at 352, 635 P.2d at 690 (Utter, J., dissenting).
Justice Utter also argued that actual damages were present because damages can include
noneconomic injury such as injury to one's psyche and to interpersonal relationships. Id. In
this case, MacLean had alleged that the ladies' night promotion made him feel like his wife's
"keeper" and injured his psychic well-being. Id.
Justice Dolliver pointed out that the majority's determination that the plaintiff suffered
no damage ignored the fact that the plaintiff also sought injunctive relief. Id. at 354, 635
P.2d at 691 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
' 48 Id. at 343, 635 P.2d at 685. The court noted that a valid purpose of the promotion
was to make family attendance cheaper, and that insofar as the spectators were married, the
discount fulfilled that purpose. Id.
' 4 ' Id.
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The MacLean court then interpreted Washington's law against
discrimination and held that the discount was not objectionable
under the act. Reasoning that the legislature's concern was that no
person be treated as unwelcome, the court concluded that this evil
was not present in MacLean.' 5° The court maintained that the dis-
count to women was not calculated to, nor was it contended that it
did, cause the plaintiff to feel undesired or unsolicited."''
Lastly, the MacLean court expressed concern about the plain-
tiff's actual reason for bringing the allegations.' 52 In the opinion,
the MacLean court suggested that the plaintiff's female attorney,
who believed that the discounts tended to stereotype women, was
the catalyst for bringing the lawsuit.'" The court reasoned that
even if the attorney was right, the objection nevertheless did not
cause the male plaintiff any injustice.'" Finally, in the discussion of
15° Id. at 343-44, 635 P.2d at 685-86.
01 Id. at 344, 635 P.2d at 686. The court quoted the United States Supreme Court in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, where black customers were refused service, and
reasoned that invidious discrimination was what the legislature intended to address. Id. (citing
Burton, 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961)). The court acknowledged that the statutory definition of
"full enjoyment" used the word "includes," which may indicate that it was non-exhaustive;
the court reasoned, however, that the statute as a whole contemplated the forbidden discrim-
ination to be damaging in effect. Id. See supra note 135 for the statutory language defining
"full enjoyment."
'" MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 345, 635 P.2d at 686.
'" Id. The court quoted the attorney's statement that appeared in an issue of the
American Bar Association Journal that the attorney had cited in her brief: "The major
concern has always been male and female stereotypes, which have the effect of perpetuating
sex discrimination.' The promotion ... 'is a come-on just to make money, because women
are viewed as sex objects. It wasn't just to be nice to the ladies.'" Id. at 345, 635 P.2d at 686-
87 (quoting Civil Rights: Blow Whistle on NBA Champs' Ladies' Nights, 65 A.B.A. J. 1619, 1619
(Nov. 1979)).
04 Id. at 345, 635 P.2d at 687. The court distinguished this case from Abosh v. New York
Yankees, a case that struck down a 100 year practice of allowing admission to women at half
price on certain days of the baseball season. Id. at 346 n.3, 635 P.2d at 687 n,3 (citing Abosh,
No. CPS-25'284, Appeal No. 1194 (N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., July 19, 1972),
reprinted in BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 1069-70). The MacLean court noted that the New York
Board was more concerned with whether the promotion worked to promote family bonds
and stimulate female attendance than with its discriminatory effect. Id.
The MacLean court also quoted a sociologist at a New York Commission Hearing who
testified that ladies' day reinforces stereotypes of women being silty in public, unathletic, and
improvident. Id. After studying the discount's success, however, the court judged that not all
women found this type of inducement offensive. Id. Also, the court noted the omission in
the sociologist's testimony of any assertion that the promotional device had an adverse effect
on men. Id.
Justice Utter in dissent, however, stated that the idea of harm from stereotyping women
did have merit in this case: "[Ladies' Day] can suggest that [women], as a class, have an
antipathy to sports and that, absent an economic `bribe,' they will not attend." Id. at 353, 635
P.2d at 690 (Utter, J., dissenting),
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the ERA issue at the end of the opinion, the court stated that the
ladies' night issue was not of constitutional import, and predicted
that the public would lose respect for the ERA if the court would
use it in the ladies' night context.' 55 As such, the MacLean judiciary
held that ladies' night at Seattle Supersonic basketball games should
be upheld.' 56
The Appellate Court of Illinois followed a similar approach in
the 1981 case of Dock Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission
by holding that the practice of giving females price discounts did
not violate the civil rights provision of Illinois's dramshop act. 157 In
Dock Club, the owners of the club permitted females to purchase
drinks at reduced prices without permitting males to do the same.' 58
After the Illinois Liquor Control Commission ("Commission") is-
sued a citation and notice of hearing against the owners, Dock Club
filed suit in the circuit court of Sangamon County in hopes of
obtaining a declaratory judgment approving of its ladies' night pro-
motion. 159 The circuit court issued an interlocutory order prohib-
iting the Commission from pursuing the citation process and the
Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed. 16°
. Noting the lack of precedent on point, the appellate court
stated that the proper test for the existence of a dramshop act
violation is whether the sex-based price differentials deny "equal
enjoyment" of the facilities to persons not allowed to benefit from
the lower price. 15 ' The Dock Club court indicated that if the owners
had designed the higher price to discourage men from patronizing
the business establishment, or if the higher price had had that effect,
then the owners had denied men "equal enjoyment."'" In the case
1" Id. at 348, 635 P.2d at 688. Justice Dolliver dissented on this point, asserting that the
basic principle of the ERA was to assure equal treatment of the sexes. ht. at 354-55, 635
P.2d at 691 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). Justice Dolliver stated that there was no alternative to
the finding that the Washington ERA proscribed the ladies' night promotion. Id. at 358, 635
P.2d at 693 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). He criticized the majority for avoiding the plain language
of the ERA by speculating about the intent of the people in adopting the amendment. Id.
L" Id. at 341, 635 P.2d at 684.
157 	 III. App. 3d 673, 673, 428 N.E.2d 735, 736 (1981). The statute states: "No
licensee ... shall deny . „ any person the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities and privileges of any premises in which alcoholic liquors are . . . sold
. ." ILL. REV. STAT. ch . 43, para. 133 (1986). Dram shop acts are statutes that regulate the
sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors. See id. at para. 94.
'" Dock Club, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 673, 428 N.E.2d at 736.
1" Id. at 674, 428 N.E.2d at 736.
LW Id. at 677, 428 N.E.2d at 738.
1111 Id. at 676, 928 N.E.2d at 738.
162 Id.
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of ladies' night discounts, however, the court concluded that the
purpose of the pricing scheme was not to discourage male patron-
age, but to encourage female patronage.' 69 Because the owners had
not prevented men from equally enjoying the facilities, the Dock
Club court held that ladies' night discounts did not violate the dram-
shop act.
In addition, the Dock Club court expressed concern that striking
down ladies' night would jeopardize other similar business pricing
discounts.'" The court noted that most companies offer reduced
prices to encourage increased business. The court noted the lack of
litigation about any of these price discounts in the past 100 years,
and held that no violation of the Illinois dramshop act existed in
Dock Club because the owners did not deny men equal enjoyment.' 65
Another case allowing preferential pricing for women to con-
tinue was the 1978 case of Magid v. Oak Park Racquet Club Associa-
tion.' 66 In this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that charg-
ing women lower annual membership fees to a racquet club did not
violate the state's public accommodation statute.' 67 Although the
statute expressly required uniform pricing practices, the Magid
court interpreted that provision to be modified by another provision
requiring plaintiffs to allege a denial of accommodations before
having a valid claim.' 68 Because the male plaintiff had not claimed
that the racquet club denied him admittance to the club or use of
its facilities, the Magid court held that his claim failed.' 69
In summary, courts upholding ladies' night promotions con-
sider several similar factors in their reasoning. As long as businesses
use the discounts to encourage female patronage, most of these
courts indicate that ladies' nights are legal if the promotion does
"33 Id. The court also noted that the dramshop act did not treat any class as a suspect
class, but rather spoke of dealing with "any person." Id.
"" Id. at 676-77, 428 N.E.2d at 738. The court spoke of the dangers of outlawing
promotions to Irish people on St. Patrick's Day, military people on Armed Forces Day,
conventioneers, senior citizens, or members of any other group. Id.
165 Id. at 677, 428 N.E.2d at 738.
16° 84 Mich. App. 522, 528, 269 N.W.2d 661, 664 (1978). A later Michigan case followed
the reasoning in Magid in holding that lower prices for female racquet club members were
legal. Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 107 Mich. App. 398, 402, 309 N.W.2d 615,
618 (1981).
161 Magid, 84 Mich. App. at 528, 269 N.W.2d at 664. The relevant statute in part states,
"All persons . . . shall be entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities
and privileges ... in all ... places of public accommodation, amusement, and recreation ...
with uniform prices." Mimi. STAT. ANN. § 28.343 (Callaghan 1981).
'6" Magid, 84 Mich. App. at 528, 269 N.W.2d at 664.
'09 Id.
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not incidentally deny males access to public facilities or make men
feel unsolicited.'" Some opinions also note the lack of precedent
and the apparent lack of concern about these discounts from simi-
larly-situated males in support of the conclusion that gender-based
discounts are not the type of discrimination legislatures intended
to invalidate.' 7 ' Most courts also favor maintaining traditional busi-
ness owner discretion in the types of pricing promotions offered,
especially, as here, where courts conclude that owners do not intend
to discriminate against men. 172 in addition, many courts are unable
to recognize any actual harm to the individual plaintiffs resulting
from ladies' nights.' 75
B. Cases Invalidating Sex-Based Discounts
Unlike the courts upholding sex-based pricing, recent courts
have held that ladies' nights do violate anti-discrimination laws.' 74
i" See, e.g., Dock Club, 101 III. App. 3d at 676-77, 428 N.E.2d at 738 (discount upheld
because owners did not exact men's higher price to discourage men from patronizing estab-
lishment, nor did it have that effect); Tucich, 107 Mich. App. at 402, 309 N.W.2d at 618
(discounts upheld because owners did not withhold, refuse, or deny accommodations to
men); Magid, 84 Mich. App. at 528, 269 N.W.2d at 664 (same); MacLean v. First Northwest
Indus., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 344, 635 P.2d 683, 686 (1981) (discounts upheld because they were
not calculated to cause male plaintiff to feel unwelcome or unaccepted).
'" E.g., Dock Club, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 677, 428 N.E.2d at 738 (stated that the lack of
litigation on the issue in the past fifty to one hundred years indicates "no evil sought to be
remedied occurred here.").
172 E.g., id. at 676-77, 428 N.E.2d at 738 (court feared similar offerings would be
invalidated if ladies' nights were not upheld).
173 E.g., Magid, 84 Mich. App. at 528, 269 N.W.2d at 664 (males needed to allege a
"withholding, refusal or denial of accommodations").
174 See, e.g., Ladd v. Iowa W. Racing Ass'n, 438 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1989) (sex-based
pricing violates state civil rights act).
In addition, in a 1967 case concerning racially-based pricing, the Massachusetts Appellate
Court held that charging black patrons more for drinks at a tavern than white patrons
violated Massachusetts's public accommodation statute. Ferguson v. Windsor Court Restau-
rant, 38 Mass. App, Dec. 120, 122 (1967). In Ferguson, the restaurant charged Ferguson and
his Afro-American friends forty cents for each bottle of ale or beer, but charged white
patrons only thirty-five cents each. Id. at 121-22. The court reasoned that this situation
violated the statute because the black plaintiffs were protected under the statute, because the
defendant's place of business constituted a public accommodation, and because the defendant
discriminated against the plaintiffs based on their skin color. Id. at 122. Consequently, the
court held that Windsor's practice violated the Massachusetts law, Id.
The Massachusetts public accommodation statute in question stated in part,
Whoever makes any distinction . . . on account of religion,, color, national
origin or race, except for good cause • .. relative to the admission of any person
to, or his treatment in, any place of public accommodation ... shall be punished
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Most of the courts striking down ladies' nights applied the statutes
strictly. 175 These courts note the repercussions of not strictly apply-
ing anti-discrimination statutes, such as maintaining inequality in
our society or imposing an individual justice's view into determining
what constitutes sex discrimination. 178
A case addressing and invalidating sex-based price discounts
under a public accommodation statute was the 1984 case of Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Board v. Dobrinoff' 77 In Dobrinoff, the Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that temporarily exempting
female patrons from cover charges in a bar violated the Pennsyl-
vania Human Relations Act. 178 The plaintiff, the Pennsylvania Li-
quor Control Board, suspended Dobrinoff's liquor license because
of violations of the act. Thereafter, the Court of Common Pleas of
Dauphin County vacated the suspension, reasoning that the bar's
temporary cover charge exemption for women was only a trivial
infraction.'" The lower court reprimanded the Board for not tak-
ing actions against more substantial offenses than the unintentional,
de minimis offense in question here.' 8° The court analogized the
Board's actions to "stomping on a mouse in the kitchen when there's
a tiger at the door."' 8 '
by a fine . . . and shall forfeit to any person aggrieved thereby not less than
$100.00 nor more than $500.00 	 . .
Id. at 120-21 (citing MASS. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 98).
The Massachusetts public accommodation statute added "sex" as a category , in 1971.
1971 ANN. SURV. MASS. L. § 20.4, at 569 (citing 1971 MASS. AcTs ch. 418, §:§ 1, 2 (amending
Mass. GEN. L. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98)). One commentator has suggested that the effect was to
repeal by implication other statutory provisions that limited barbers from providing services
to women and that limited hairdressers from serving male customers. See id. The new
provision also affected men-only taverns that were to be exempt from the act until 1973, in
response to owners' requests. Id. at 570.
173 See, e.g., Ladd, 438 N.W.2d at 602 ("[W]e . . . do not believe a de minimis exception
for ... discrimination is viable. Nor does the statute suggest we should attempt to make such
distinctions.").
1" See, e.g., id.
177 80 Pa. Cotnmnw. 453, 457, 471 A.2d 941, 943 (1984).
178 Id. The Pennsylvania law prohibits "place[s] of public accommodation, resort or
amusement" from discriminating on the basis of sex. Id. at 455, 471 A.2d at 942 (citing PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, 955(i)(1) (Purdon)).
179 	 at 455, 456-57, 471 A.2d at 942, 943. The trial court referred to the situation in
this way: "[O]n two occasions, when go-go girls were the 'entree' of the evening, a female
patron was exempted from the $1.00 cover charge . . . requested of the male voyeurs." Id.
at 455-56, 471 A.2d at 942. Other charges against the Flintrock Inn included tap mislabeling
and failure to serve food as required by statute. Id. at 455, 471 A.2d at 942.
180 See id. at 456-57, 471 A.2d at 943.
18 ' Id.
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On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania re-
versed, reinstating the liquor license suspension. 182 The court held
that the Pennsylvania statute did not distinguish between major and
minor violations and did not require intent in order to be prohibited
as discriminatory. 183 Therefore, because the statute was unambig-
uous and proscribed all sex discrimination in public accommoda-
tions, the Dobrinoff court held that giving unisex price discounts
violated the Pennsylvania statute as a matter of law.'"
Similarly, the Supreme Court of California held in the 1985
case of Koire v. Metro Car Wash that giving women reduced prices
at bars and car washes on specified days of the week violated Cali-
fornia's Unruh Act, an act prohibiting discrimination in businesses
based on, among other classifications, sex.' 85 In Koire, the male
plaintiff filed suit against seven car washes and one bar alleging that
the sex-based discounts violated the California law. 186 The trial court
held for the defendants, denying Koire statutory damages and in-
junctive relief.'"
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the de-
fendants engaged in discriminatory practices. The Koire court rea-
soned that the Unruh Act prohibited not only the outright exclusion
of prospective patrons from business establishments, but also re-
quired equal treatment of the patrons as well.'" The court rejected
the business argument that rational self-interest such as increased
profitability justified the sex-based price differences. 189 Analogizing
182 Id. at 458-59, 471 A.2d at 944.
185 Id. at 457, 471 A.2d at 943. The court noted that the trial court's suggestion regarding
the reason for the pricing scheme being "'chivalry and courtesy to the fair sex, — rather than
discrimination against men, even if true, was irrelevant. Id.
l" Id.
1 " 40 Cal. 3d 24, 707 P.2d 195, 219 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1985). The Unruh Act states: "All
persons . are free and equal, and no matter what their sex ... are entitled to the full and
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establish-
ments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1990).
'" Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 27-28, 707 P.2d at 196, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 134. The discounts for
women ranged from 4% to 38%. Id, at 27 n.2, 707 P.2d at 195 n.2, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 133
n.2.
Student authors have written on this case. See Note, Is Ladies' Night Out?, supra note 4,
at 613-15; Note, Koire v. Metro Car Wash: Gender Based Promotional Procedures Okay With
Unruh, 12 W. Sr. U.L. REV. 895 (1985); California Supreme Court Survey, 13 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 861, 887-89 (1986); 1985 California Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal Survey: Entertain-
ment Law, 8 WHITHER L. REV. 157, 158-60 (1986).
' 87 Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 27-28, 707 P.2d at 196, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
188 Id. at 29, 707 P.2d at 197, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
189 Id. at 32, 707 P.2d at 199, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (citing Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson,
30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982)).
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to another type of sex discrimination, the court reasoned that en-
trepreneurs may find it economically advantageous to exclude hom-
osexuals or heterosexuals from their business premises, but that this
• rational economic motive would not make the practice valid under
California's anti-discrimination act.'" The Koire court further stated
that it would be no less a violation of the act to charge homosexuals
or heterosexuals reduced rates to encourage their patronage solely
because it was profitable to do so. The Koire court also noted that
few courts have held discriminatory treatment to be nonarbitrary
based solely on the special nature of the business establishment,
especially when no strong public policy supports the treatment.'"'
In addition, the court dismissed the bar owner's argument that
Ladies' Nights were justified because they promoted interaction
between the sexes. Because the Koire court reasoned that such in-
teraction is not deemed to be a socially desirable goal of the state,
it held that ladies' nights do not fall within a social policy exception
to discrimination.'" As an example of a practice that would fit
under the social policy exception, the Koire court pointed out that
the state's interest in ensuring adequate housing for the elderly
justified differential treatment in housing rentals based on age. The
court held that the state had much less interest in encouraging
mixed male and female patronage at a bar.'"
The Koire court also rejected an argument that the ladies' day
discounts injure neither men nor women. First, the court noted that
the legislature intended arbitrary sex discrimination in businesses
jga Id.
X 91 Id. at 31, 707 P.2d at 198, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 136. The court also addressed the
argument that a rejection of ladies' nights would affect all promotional discounts. The court
noted that discounts are legal as long as they are applied alike to all persons. For instance,
the court mentioned the validity of discounts to all customers once a week, or allowing
discounts based on having a coupon or wearing a certain colored shirt.
The court also distinguished sex-based pricing from age-based pricing. The court stated
that age-based pricing is supported by other state laws promoting differential treatment
because of the limited earning powers of children and elderly persons. Id. at 37, 707 P.2d at
203, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 141. No such justification, the court reasoned, exists for sex-based
discounts. The court said that although women do generally earn less than men, the societal
remedy for this inequity is equal employment opportunities, not sex-based pricing. The
argument that the practice was designed to be "remedial" to women due to lower income
was especially without merit because the court found the night club's profit motive to be
obvious. Id. at 37 n.18, 707 P.2d at 203 n.18, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 141 n.18.
192 Id. at 33, 707 P.2d at 199, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
193 Id. at 33, 707 P.2d at 200, 219 Cat. Rptr. at 138. The court likewise disagreed with
the argument that the gender-based discounts were valid because they did not exclude men
or make them feel unwelcome. Id. at 33 n.12, 707 P.2d at 200 n.12, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 138
n.12.
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to be per se injurious.' 94 Second, the court recognized actual damage
to the plaintiff because he had to pay more than female patrons,
and was angered by the unfair treatment.'" The Koire court noted
that the Unruh Act focuses on individuals rather than classes of
persons and concluded that this focus supported individual claims
for damages. In addition, the court emphasized that sex-based price
differences are generally injurious to both men and women because
they reinforce harmful stereotypes.' 96 The court stated that as long
as the legal system continues to uphold differential treatment be-
tween the sexes, such as female-oriented discounts, men and women
will not perceive each other as equals.' 97
Finally, the Koire court discussed differing views on the impor-
tance of striking down sex-based price discounts.'" The court men-
tioned that the judiciary is often hesitant to strike down traditional
practices such as ladies' nights because the practices seem harmless.
The court noted that some persons, however, take great offense to
such practices. As such, the Koire court concluded that the final
decision regarding the legality of a ladies' night should not be based
on a judge's subjective value judgment regarding the seriousness of
the discrimination. Therefore, the Koire court held that charging
females reduced prices at bars and car washes violated California's
Unruh Act.'"
In addition, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in the
1986 case of Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, held that ladies' night
194 Id. at 33, 707 P.2d at 200, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 138. Section 52 of the act provides for
minimum statutory damages of $250 for each violation of section 51, without regard to actual
damages. Id.
195 Id. at 34, 707 P.2d at 200, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39. The court referred to the
plaintiff's testimony at trial in which he spoke of how he felt when he heard advertisements
promoting free admission for girls 18-21 years of age at Jezebel's. The plaintiff testified, "It
just smoked me." Id. at 34 n.15, 707 P.2d at 200-01 n.15, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 139 n.15. The
plaintiff also testified that he was ridiculed and treated with hostility when he asked to be
charged a woman's rate at the car washes. Id.
195 Id. at 34, 707 P.2d at 201, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (citing BABCOCK, supra note 7, at
1069, and Note, Washington's Equal Rights Amendment and Law Against Discrimination—The
Approval of the Seattle Sorties'"Ladies' Night", 58 WASH. L. REV. 465, 473 (1983)).
197 Id. at 34-35, 707 P.2d at 201, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (citing KANowirt, WOMEN AND
THE LAW 4 (1969)). The court said that whether these particular defendants consciously
based their discounts on sexual stereotypes, the practice, nonetheless, had traditionally been
of that character. Id. at 35, 707 P.2d at 201, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 139. See generally Cavanagh, "A
Little Dearer than His Horse": Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine Personality, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 260 (1971) (discussing traditional stereotyping of women).
195 Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 39, 707 P.2d at 204, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
199 Id.
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discounts violated a Montgomery County Ordinance. 200 After re-
ceiving a complaint from Mr. Peppin, the Montgomery County
Human Relations Commission informed the owner of Woodside
that they had reason to believe that Woodside's ladies' night pro-
motion violated the county's public accommodation law because it
treated the sexes unequally. The owner abolished the "Ladies'
Night" promotion and immediately began a "Skirt and Gown Night"
entitling Thursday night patrons—male or female—wearing skirts
or gowns, a fifty percent price reduction on meals. 20 '
Thereafter, the Commission's Public Accommodation Panel
held a hearing to decide if the two promotions, "Ladies' Night" and
"Skirt and Gown Night," violated the Montgomery County Code
that makes it illegal to discriminate based on sex. 202 The panel
unanimously found that "Ladies' Night" violated the code. In a split
decision, it also held that "Skirt and Gown Night" was a violation
as it was essentially a ladies' night in disguise. On appeal, the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County affirmed the finding regarding "La-
dies' Night," but reversed on the "Skirt and Gown" issue. The circuit
court reasoned that men wear pants only because they choose to do
so and that therefore, "Skirt and Gown Night" was facially neutral
and non-discriminatory."'
Mr. Peppin appealed this decision to the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals. The court agreed with Peppin that the case was
not trivial, explaining that it feared repercussions of not addressing
the case presently, such as encouraging the practice of more serious
discrimination.204 The Peppin court noted that females constituted
2ou 67 Md. App. 39, 48, 506 A.2d 263, 267-68 (1986). The human relations law states:
It shall be unlawful for any owner	 of any place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement within this county:
(a) To make any distinction with respect to any person based on . . . sex
. . . in connection with admission to, service or sales in, or price, quality or use
of any facility or service of any place of public accommodation, resort or
amusement in the county.
Id. at 41, 506 A.2d at 264 (citing MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE § 27-9).
son Id. at 41-42, 506 A.2d at 264. This new promotion captured great media attention.
Id. at 42 n.1, 506 A.2d at 264 n.I (newspapers reported on the new promotion, covering
how Woodside planned to "skirt the [sex discrimination] issue."); see Stoltz, supra note 8, at
7 (question in television's Hollywood Squares asked, 'Where in the nation would wearing a
dress earn a man a half-price dinner?'").
I" Peppin, 67 Md. App. at 42, 506 A.2d at 264.
2" Id. at 42, 506 A.2d at 265. The circuit court said that the promotion did not "'impact
or burden men in any significant manner, [and that it] is not an immutable characteristic of
the male gender [to wear pants.]"' Id. at 42-43, 506 A.2d at 265.
204 Id. at 43, 506 A.2d at 265.
516	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:487
the overwhelming majority of patrons benefiting from a discount
given to patrons wearing skirts and gowns. 205 The court also rea-
soned that "Skirt and Gown Night" discriminated against men be-
cause it was intended to function and did function as a ladies'
night. 2°6 The Peppin court thus held that the Human Relations
Commission's finding of discrimination should be reinstated. 207
The 1989 case of Ladd v. Iowa West Racing Association also held
that sex-based price differentials constitute discrimination under its
anti-discrimination statute. 2" In Ladd, the Supreme Court of Iowa
held that a racetrack's "Ladies' Day" promotion granting women
free admission and providing discounted prices on concessions vi-
olated Iowa's civil rights act. 209 The defendant, Bluffs Run, argued
that the statute did not proscribe all disparate treatment, but only
treatment that denied persons access to public accommodations or
services. The trial court sustained Bluffs Run's motion to dismiss
after Ladd had submitted his case.m
The Iowa Supreme Court, however, refused to accept Bluffs
Run's defense, noting that the legislature mandated in unambigu-
ous statutory language a broad application of the law.2 " The Ladd
"5 Id. at 45, 506 A.2d at 266.
2°B Id. at 46, 506 A.2d at 266. Regarding the circuit court's idea that men wear pants
because they exercise a fashion preference to do so, the court of special appeals stated,
"Although it is conceivable that some men may fantasize their appearance of frolicking about
in a skirt or gown, those items normally remain in the closets—of their wives." Id,
407 Id. at 48, 506 A.2d at 267-68. The court stated that the pertinent language of the
ordinance was that the owner could not 'make any distinction with respect to . . . sex . . . in
connection with admission to, service, or sales in, or price, ... of anyplace of public accommodation
. . . .'" Id., 506 A.2d at 267 (emphasis in original).
248 438 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1989).
209 Id. Iowa's Civil Rights Act stated:
It shall be an unfair or.discriminatory practice for any owner ... of any
public accommodation ... [t]o refuse or deny to any person because of ... sex
. . the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges thereof,
or otherwise to discriminate against any person because of ... sex . . . in the
furnishing of such accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.7 (West 1988).
210 Ladd, 438 N.W.2d at 601. Before going to the district court, Ladd received a release
to sue from the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. Id.
211 Id. at 602. City of Clearwater v. Studebaker's Dance Club also determined that consider-
ations such as whether the classification is innocuous or designed to benefit males are
irrelevant when construing an unambiguous ordinance. 516 So. 2d 1106, 1108-09 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987). In this case the owners of a dance club denied males membership in a "Pink
Ladies Club" that gave women discounted drinks. Id. at 1107. The Florida District Court of
Appeal found Clearwater's ordinance unambiguous and struck down the practice. Id. at
1108.
The relevant ordinance reads: "It shall be unlawful discriminatory practice for any ..
place of public accommodation, resort or amusement, because of the . . . sex . . . of any
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court reasoned that discrimination may exist in varying degrees of
seriousness and that it may often accompany a legitimate purpose. 212
The court maintained, however, that carving a de minimis exception
to the civil rights act would not be viable because of difficult line-
drawing. The Ladd court also noted that distinguishing between
intentional and unintentional violations would destroy the effec-
tiveness of the statute. Thus, the Ladd court held that allowing price
discounts to women at the racetrack violated the Iowa act. 213
In conclusion, courts invalidating ladies' nights utilize similar
reasoning. The courts interpret their state laws as prohibiting more
than just denial of access to public facilities or making men feel
unwanted. 214 Some courts also reason that creating de minimis ex-
ceptions to broadly-reaching and unambiguous statutes, or excep-
tions for unintentional acts, would involve difficult line-drawing and
thus would defeat the statutory purpose of combatting arbitrary
discrimination. 216 In addition, most recent courts have rejected a
business profitability defense and note that invalidating ladies'
nights would not prohibit the use of other discounts made equally
available to all patrons. 216 As for injury due to the discounts, some
judges are concerned with the stereotypes involved in ladies' night
promotions, as well as economic harm to men. 2 " Finally, many
courts state that ladies' night claims are not trivial because judicial
approval of sex-based discounts may set precedents that encourage
ever-increasing exceptions to illegal sex discrimination, as well as
person . . . to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities or privileges thereof, that are afforded the other customers . 	 at
1108 (citing CITY Or CLEARWATER COOP, 99.1 I (a)).
212 Ladd, 438 N.W.2d at 602.
225 Id.
414 E.g., Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 707 P.2d 195, 197, 219 Cal. Rptr.
133, 135 (1985) (statute's proscription broad enough to cover sex-based price discounts),
" 5 E.g., Ladd v. Iowa W. Racing Ass'n, 438 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1989) ("IWje ... do
not believe ... a de minimis exception' for ... discrimination is viable. Nor does the statute
suggest we should attempt to make such distinctions.").
216 E.g., Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 32, 36, 707 P.2d at 199, 202, 219 Cal, Rptr. at 137, 140
(court stated that profitability did not override discrimination concerns, especially when
businesses could use neutral discounts instead).
217 See, e.g., id. at 34, 707 P,2c1 at 200-01, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39 (court pointed to
the economic injury to the male plaintiff, as well as the discount's effect of making him feel
unfairly treated); Peppin v. Woodside Delicatessen, 67 Md. App. 39, 46, 506 A.2d 263, 266
(1986) (court • held half-price discount on food placed significant burden upon men); Abosh
v. New York Yankees, No. CPS-25284, Appeal No. 1194 (N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal
Bd., July 19, 1972), reprinted in BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 1070 (discusses female stereotypes
surrounding ladies' day at New York Yankees baseball games).
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results contrary to the broad policy found in anti-discrimination
statutes. 218
III. LADIES' NIGHT PROMOTIONS SHOULD BE BARRED
The recent courts that bar the use of ladies' night discounts are
correct in recognizing the harm in such promotions. The early
courts' and the public's apparent amusement in the subject matter
of ladies' night lawsuits, however, is problematic. To understand
why people may incorrectly consider the effects of sex-based dis-
counts to be trivial, and to counter this attitude, legal attempts to
combat gender discrimination in general must be examined before
focusing on the ladies' night cases themselves.
One pitfall to equalizing the sexes is that the Supreme Court
and Congress have ranked combatting sex discrimination lower in
priority than striking down other forms of discrimination. For ex-
ample, Title II does not address sex discrimination, but it does
protect many other categories of persons. 2 i 9 In addition, the Su-
preme Court, when hearing a fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection challenge to sex discrimination, applies only an intermediate
standard of review, rather than the strict scrutiny review. 220 The
Court appears to soften' the harm of sex discrimination, thereby
perpetuating discriminatory and stereotypical attitudes.22 ' Although
some states have chosen to be much tougher on sex discrimina-
tion,222 the Supreme Court and Congress are still sending out strong
signals that sex discrimination is of secondary importance.
Beyond which law or standard to apply, several themes recur
in gender cases which, if not addressed seriously, could be harmful
to women. One common theme is that of romantic paternalism. 223
218 See, e.g., Ladd, 438 N.W.2d at 602 (court feared overriding the statutory purpose
with exceptions); Peppin, 67 Md. App. at 43, 506 A.2d at 265 (court feared encouraging
more serious methods of discrimination by creating exceptions).
219 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of Title II.
22° See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standard of
review. See also L. TRIBE, SUPER note 36, 16-26, at 1561-65 (background of intermediate
test); Wildman, supra note 83, at 276-87 (discussing cases leading to intermediate standard
of review).
"' Wildman, supra note 83, at 286; see Aiken, Differentialing Sex From Sex: The Male
Irresistible Impulse, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357, 357 (1983-84) (arguing that courts
have not "wholeheartedly embraced the idea of equality of the sexes").
444 	 e.g., BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 1037 (noting inclusion of sex in state counterparts
to Title II). See supra note 174 for a discussion of the addition of "sex" to Massachusetts'
public accommodation statute.
"3 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of paternalism and
gender discrimination.
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The Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson recognized this as the
pedestal-turned-into-cage problem. 224 Labeling their actions as care,
protection, or humanitarianism, some legislatures and judges, the
majority of whom were male, "protected" women by controlling the
areas in which women could take active roles. 225 For instance, in
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., an employer denied
a woman the opportunity to receive increased pay by rejecting her
application for a switchman's job because the company thought that
the job was too strenuous for a woman.226
Often intertwined with the theme of paternalism is the problem
of sexual stereotyping. For example, in Frontier°, the court ad-
dressed a statute that presumed the stereotype that women were
dependent on their husbands. 227 Apparently, the legislature decided
that women would automatically require financial support and pa-
ternalistically set out to provide that support. 228 In addition, in
Weeks, the employer stereotyped women to be too weak to handle
the switchman's position. 229 In effect, the male decisionmakers stig-
matized the women as weak and dependent, further contributing
to keeping women in their places. Fortunately, the courts in both
of those cases struck down the respective sex-based classifications. 2"
Along with the themes of paternalism and stereotyping, courts
have also addressed the issue of so-called trivial violations of sex
discrimination laws. 23 ' Judges may experience difficulty identifying
the harm in classifications which appear insignificant because many
judges are short-sighted. Instead of trying to identify the harm,
judges and citizens at large may abruptly label a cause of action
frivolous or trivial.282 A concurring justice in Allyn v. Allison did just
that. The justice admitted that requiring only women to use certain
designations ("Miss" or "Mrs.") reflecting marital status when reg-
istering to vote may be unconstitutional, but thought that the in-
2" See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). See supra notes 49-50 for a
discussion of Frontiero.
" 5 See Cavanagh, supra note 197, at 262.
226 408 F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 1969). See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Weeks.
221 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 681.
228 See id.
2 See Weeks, 408 F.2d at 234.
23° Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-91; Weeks, 408 F.2d at 236.
261 See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of triviality and gender
discrimination.
232 See, e.g., Allyn v. Allison, 34 Cal. App. 3d 448, 454, 110 Cal. Rptr. 77, 80-81 (1973)
(Roth, J., concurring).
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fraction was too insubstantial to address.233 Rather than reaching
the correct result, that justice refused to look beyond his own sub-
jective views regarding triviality. 234 A much safer avenue for the
judiciary than infusing subjective views into opinions is to utilize a
bright-line rule of no sex discrimination. In doing so, judges will
alleviate the risk of perpetuating dangerous, but oftentimes hard
to recognize, injuries to the sexes. One author suggested the true
danger of the voter registration law in Allyn. He believed that the
law's main effect was symbolic: telling a woman that before she can
vote, she must declare how she relates to men. 235
The problem of perceived triviality in sex discrimination cases
occurs for both male and female plaintiffs. A male plaintiff lost in
Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co. because the majority abruptly labeled
a male-only hair length regulation trivia1. 238 The court noted that,
in its view, employer male-only hair length codes were not tradi-
tionally-flagged sources of discrimination. The Barker court refused
to look at the case from the male plaintiff's point of view, despite
the obvious difference in treatment between male and female em-
ployees. The dissent, however, correctly recognized that individuals
greatly value being able to control their own hairstyles. 237
Tradition and the problem of looking at a sex discrimination
case from a male plaintiff's point of view goes beyond cases with
arguable trivial undertones. Male-initiated cases, in general, capture
much attention.238 As Justice Rehnquist noted in Michael M. v. Son-
oma County, part of the controversy is because men do not share the
history that women do of being victims of discrimination. 239 As the
Court in Orr v. Orr pointed out, however, many times the abundance
of male plaintiffs is due to legislation designed to compensate
"3 Id. (Roth, J., concurring).
234 Id.
235 Karst, supra note 65, at 505.
"6 See Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977).
237 See id. at 405 (McCree, J., dissenting).
238 See generally Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's Rights in a Man's World,
2 LAw & INEQUALITY 33 (1984) (focusing on male-initiated cases); Wildman, supra note 83,
at 299-300 (discussing male-initiated cases).
Y]9 	 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1981). Regarding his belief whether discrimination against
men might hurt females, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Craig v. Boren, stated that he was
skeptical of the proposition that discrimination against men "redound[s] to the detriment of
females, because [it] tend[s] to reinforce 'old notions' restricting the roles and opportunities
of women." 429 U.S. 190, 220 n.2 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). One commentator
concluded that Justice Rehnquist believed discrimination against men did not count for
constitutional purposes. See Wildman, supra note 83, at 293.
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women for past discrimination.240 This legislation has the effect of
denying males the favored treatment given to females. Interestingly,
the Court's rationale in Orr was geared to striking down protection-
ist stereotypes about women rather than to reaching the harm to
males. 24 ' One author suggested that in many of the male-initiated
cases, female attorneys seek male plaintiffs to aid the attorneys in
gaining equality for females in situations where the laws favor
women, 292
These policies and themes that recur in many of the traditional
gender discrimination cases are equally apparent in the ladies' night
cases. Through these gender-based promotions, females receive
financial benefits not given to men that have stereotypical and pa-
ternalistic undertones. Similarly, ladies' nights represent a form of
discrimination that some may argue has trivial consequences and
should be left untouched, perhaps due to the great number of years
that the discounts have been in place. A closer examination, how-
ever, reveals that allowing the promotional practice has serious
detrimental consequences for both sexes.
In general, courts appear willing to allow challenges to stereo-
types only after the stereotypes have become outdated. 245 Some
commentators call this phenomenon "judicial lag." For example, the
court in Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co. used traditional sources of
discrimination, rather than present standards of discrimination as
its reference point when upholding an employer male-only hair
length regulation.244 This suggests that only after the long hair
stereotype is outmoded will the court strike down such a regulation.
The judicial lag criticism is valid in ladies' night cases, as well. At
least one court has noted that it had heard of no other plaintiff
bringing a similar ladies' night case in its jurisdiction to boost its
support of upholding the practice. 245
In addition to judicial lag, another reason that stereotypes con-
tinue is because the general public does not realize that sex bias is
occurring. For instance, ladies' day at New York Yankees' baseball
games continued for 100 years before anyone challenged the pro-
24° See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
24 ' See id.
242 Cole, supra note 238, at 37.
243 See Aiken, supra note 221, at 358 (supporting judicial lag criticism).
244 See Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401-02 (6th Cir. 1977). See supra
notes 70-78 for a discussion of Barker.
243 E.g., Dock Club, Inc. v, Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 101 Ill. App. 3d 673, 677,
428 N.E.2d 735, 738 (1981).
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motion. 246 The plaintiffs who brought ladies' night cases, however,
did attack the gender-based stereotypes, 247
These plaintiffs correctly recognized that several stereotypes
are present when owners promote ladies' nights. First, these dis-
counts assume that males are the breadwinners and that females
need price breaks due to lower economic status. 248 An examination
of the other categories of people offered price breaks reveals that
courts are operating under this assumption. These other groups
tend to be needy and indigent.249
Second, price discounts stereotype women as sex objects. 25° In
bars, the "pedestal-turned-into-cage" metaphor is especially appro-
priate. Bars use discounts to entice women to gather at their busi-
nesses, which in turn is used to encourage male patronage. As such,
business owners also view men stereotypically. The men are as-
sumed to have animalistic sex drives and irresistible impulses to be
where women gather. 25 ' Neither men nor women are treated with
respect in these situations. Instead the discounts have the effect of
degrading the individual dignity and humanity of both sexes.
Third, price discounts in a sports context may cause women to
be viewed as less interested in and less knowledgeable about sports
than men by suggesting that women need an extra nudge to attend
245 	 v. New York Yankees, No. CPS-25284, Appeal No. 1194 (N.Y. State Human
Rights Appeal Bd., July 19, 1972), reprinted in, BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 1070.
247 E.g., MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 345, 635 P.2d
683, 686-87 (1981) (plaintiff maintained that ladies' nights stereotype women); see also Koire
v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 35, 707 P.2d 195, 201, 219 Cal. Rptr. 133, 139 (1985)
(court criticized as stereotypical reasoning the MacLean court's statement that women might
not have as much interest in sports as men do). •
249 	 Koire, 40 Cal. 3d at 37 n.18, 707 P.2d at 203 n.18, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 141 n.18;
Abosh v. New York Yankees, No. CPA-25284, Appeal No. 1194 (N.Y. State Human Rights
Appeal Bd., July 19, 1972), reprinted in BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 1070.
2" See, e.g., MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 341-42, 635 P.2d at 687. Some of these groups
were senior citizens, low-income citizens, and students. Id.
2" See Civil Rights: Blow Whistle on NBA Champs' Ladies' Nights, 65 A.B.A. J. 1619, 1619
(Nov, 1979) (speaking of how discounts treat women as sex objects); see also City of Clearwater
v. Studebaker's Dance Club, 516 So. 2d 1106, 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (lower court
determined that design of promotion was to "increase the enjoyment of males by enticing
the attendance of more females . . ."); Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Dobrinoff, 80
Pa. Commnw. 453, 455-56, 471 A.2d 941, 942 (1984) (lower court described the facts as "on
two occasions, when go-go girls were the 'entree' of the evening, a female patron was
exempted from the $1.00 cover charge, which was requested of the male voyeurs.").
241 See Dobrinoff, 80 Pa. Commnw. at 456, 471 A.2d at 942 (lower court referred to male
patrons as "voyeurs"); Aiken, supra note 221, at 375 (stereotype may be that "the mixing of
the sexes inherently causes strong and sometimes uncontrollable impulses in men [and that]
unscrupulous and nonvirtuous women can take advantage of these impulses and . . men
are 'victims' of their own urges.").
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these events.252 A sociologist also mentioned that men may equate
ladies' day at a sporting event with silliness because many men
expect women to shriek loudly and act immature in such contexts. 253
Many stereotypes, therefore, are embodied in ladies' night promo-
tions. When the legal system fails to strike down these stereotypical
practices, the more likely result will be that men and women will
not perceive each other as equals.
Another issue courts traditionally address in gender discrimi-
nation cases is whether they should distinguish between serious and
trivial infractions. A commentator criticized the Allyn v. Allison opin-
ion for trivializing the requirement that women register to vote
using "Miss" or "Mrs." 254 Likewise, criticism is appropriate for those
ladies' night courts that avoided the obvious discrimination of sex-
based pricing by reasoning that the discounts are de minimis infrac-
tions and too trivial to attack seriously. 255
To the contrary, because of the dangerous stereotypes and
harm to both sexes, the discounts are not too trivial to address and
courts should not create de minimis exceptions for this otherwise
discriminatory practice. When courts strike down ladies' nights, they
strike down arbitrary discrimination—which the statutes are de-
signed to combat. On the other hand, when courts create exceptions
for de minimis infractions, they risk perpetuating the idea that a little
sex discrimination is acceptable, and risk creating more exceptions
that could eventually defeat the statutory purpose. 256
As pointed out previously, however, some judges are more lax
in invalidating gender discrimination when men are the plaintiffs. 257
Judges should not treat such a case differently, however, just be-
cause the plaintiff is male. Even though males do not have a history
252 See BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 1069 (referring to sociologist's testimony at New York
City Commission hearings); see also MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 353, 635 P.2d at 690 (Utter, J.,
dissenting) ("[ladies' day] can suggest that [women] , have an antipathy to sports and that,
absent an economic 'bribe,' they will not attend.").
255 See BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 1069.
254 Karst, .supra note 65, at 501. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Allyn.
254 See, e.g., Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 164 Cal. App. 3d 298, 209 Cal. Rptr. 233, 234—
35 (1984) (court referred to ladies' night promotion as "merely preferred treatment for
women ... in the form of petty price discounts"), reed, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 707 P.2d 195, 219
Cal. Rptr. 133 (1985); MacLean v, First Northwest Indus. of Am., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 340, 655
P.2d 683, 684 (1981) (court noted that women paid $2.50 for admission, while men paid
only $5.00).
4y6 See Ladd v. Iowa W. Racing Ass'n, 438 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1989).
251 See supra notes 83-106 and 238-239 and accompanying text for discussions of male-
i nitiated cases.
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of discrimination, they are clearly treated unequally and harmed in
many situations, including ladies' night cases.
No one can deny that males have to pay more for admission
or drinks in these public' places than women do when women get a
special discount. In MacLean v. First Northwest Industries of America,
where the court upheld half-price ticket prices for women at Seattle
Supersonic basketball games, the court reasoned that men actually
benefit from ladies' nights because when they pay for their wives
or girlfriends, the men pay less overall than if the promotion had
not been in effect. 258 The court also emphasized that because a sole
male patron paying full price had the option of bringing along a
female, he prevented himself from benefiting from the ladies' dis-
count.259
The main problem with this argument is that the court's very
reasoning embodies harmful stereotypes by implying that men
bring and pay for women. One also wonders how a man inures a
"benefit" from paying for two people. In addition, in a tavern
context, owners promoting ladies' nights reinforce a stereotype that
men are ruled by their sex drives. 260
Further, although males are harmed and have initiated the
ladies' night cases, much of the problem with the discounts is the
effect that they have on women. Because women are treated, at
least ostensibly, with favor, they may have trouble bringing legal
actions themselves. 261 Women should not, however, be content with
passively watching from the sidelines. In order to ensure that the
judges striking down the discounts recognize the harmful nature of
stereotypes and paternalism toward women, one recommendation
is that women continue attacking the sex-based practices and atti-
tudes as amici curiae. 262 Otherwise, judges may note the economic
harm to men when striking down the discounts, but will overlook
the harm to women. 263 As a consequence of pointing out harmful
226 See MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 343-44, 635 P.2d at 685. See supra notes 134-156 and
accompanying text for a discussion of MacLean.
222 MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 343, 635 P.2d at 685.
1'60 See Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Dobrinoff, 80 Pa. Commnw. 453, 456, 471
A.2d 941, 942 (1984) (lower court referred to male patrons as "voyeurs"); Aiken, supra note
221, at 375 (stereotype may be that "the mixing of the sexes inherently causes strong and
sometimes uncontrollable impulses in men [and that] unscrupulous and nonvirtuous women
can take advantage of these impulses and . . . men are 'victims' of their own urges.").
26' See Cole, supra note 238, at 37, 53 (discussing difficulty of women plaintiffs bringing
suits when women are given favorable treatment).
262 See id. at 37 (discussing how women participated as attorneys or amici curiae in cases
with male plaintiffs).
262 See Wildman, supra note 83, at 299-300 (concerned that courts never consider the
March 1991]	 LADIES' NIGHT DISCOUNTS	 525
stereotypes in ladies' night cases, judges may be more apt to transfer
their enlightened attitudes to other cases as well. This would be a
good start in combatting sex-based attitudes overall.
Present attitudes about sex discrimination are captured in anti-
discrimination statutes. 264 Although federal law does not protect the
sexes from discrimination in public accommodations, many states
were dissatisfied with Title II in a sex discrimination context. 265
Many states expanded their state public accommodation statutes, or
their equivalents, to include gender. 266 In states with gender as a
protected category in their statutes, then, even a practice that ap-
pears harmless, such as sex-based pricing should be treated seriously
and struck down.
The various state statutes used in the ladies' night cases were
often similarly phrased. 267 The primary purpose of enacting the
public accommodation laws was to prohibit establishments that serve
the public from practicing arbitrary discrimination, and to combat
the humiliation and psychological harm to persons who experience
such arbitrary discrimination. 268 Many statutes had broad language
harm to women along with the harm to men when deciding to strike down sex discrimination
against men), Wildman noted that, ironically, most cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court
has combatted sex discrimination by striking down gender-based classifications have involved
discrimination against men. Id. at 299. The author says to the extent that these decisions also
stand for women being economically self-sufficient, the Court is also combatting sex discrim-
ination against women. Id. However, she argues that the main thrust of this line of decisions
is not ending sex discrimination against women, but rather ending the harm of discrimination
as it hurts male plaintiffs. Id, Further, she believes that although sexually discriminatory
attitudes hurt men, the "overwhelming evidence is that women are the real victims of sex
discrimination," and that the lack of Court attention to the fact that women are the real
victims, enables the Court to preserve the existing ideology of equality without making any
significant changes in the status quo of sex discrimination. Id. at 300.
264 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000a-6 (1982) (Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2(a) (1981) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
265 See BABCOCK, supra note 7, at 1037.
266 See supra note 174 for a discussion of the addition of "sex" to Massachusetts' public
accommodation statute.
267 The California Court of Appeal, in upholding a ladies' night promotion, noted that
the relevant California statute was "strikingly similar" to the Washington statute that had
been interpreted to uphold ladies' nights. See Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 164 Cal. App. 3d
298, 209 Cal. Rpm 233, 236 (1984), rev'd, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 707 P.2d 195, 219 Cal. Rptr. 133
(1985). The Supreme Court of California later reversed the lower court's decision noting
that, under the relevant California statute, ladies' nights were unlawful. See Koire v. Metro
Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 39, 707 P.2d 195, 204, 219 Cal. Rptr. 133, 142 (1985). At least one
court, however, reached its decision based on the uniqueness of its state's statutory language.
See Ladd v. Iowa W. Racing Ass'n, 438 N,W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 1989) (court stated that
because "significant differences" exist between Iowa's act and acts of other states, the court
did not find similar decisions from other jurisdictions to be helpful).
2" See Comment, An Uncertain Guarantee, supra note 4, at 465 & nn.110-11 (stating
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mandating much more than simply access to the public facilities. 269
In addition, the statutes involved in the ladies' night cases did not
mention that only "serious" discrimination should be prohibited,
nor did they expressly require intent. 2" Although some courts up-
holding the promotions stated that they were basing their decisions
on statutory interpretation, 2" in reality, subjective judicial differ-
ences in what constitutes sex discrimination played a major role in
causing the discrepancies among states.
These courts could more reasonably have interpreted the stat-
utes to prohibit ladies' night discounts rather than allowing their
subjective judicial opinions to govern what is considered discrimi-
natory under the clearly-worded statutes. 272 Instead, the courts
agreed with the owners in these cases that businesses should be able
to continue promoting ladies' nights because, otherwise, they will
have to end all promotional discounts to their detriment. 273 That
purpose of anti-discrimination laws of some states and policy behind enacting Title 11); Note,
Is Ladles' Night Out?, supra note 4, at 1616-17 (stating purpose of statutes of Washington,
Michigan, Illinois, and California which were involved in ladies' night cases).
"9 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.7 (West 1988) (states that it is unlawful for "any
owner . . . of any public accommodation ... [t]o . . . deny to any person because of ... sex
. . . the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges thereof . . . ."); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 28.343 (Callaghan 1981) (states that "fall] persons ... shall be entitled to full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges .. in all . places of public
accommodation, amusement, and recreation . . . with uniform prices."); WASH. Rev. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.030 (Supp. 1989) (states that the protection against sex discrimination "shall
include, but not be limited to: . . . [Ole right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommo-
dations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation,
assemblage, or amusement . . . .").
However, many courts upholding the sex-based discounts circumvented the plain mean-
ing of their statutes by interpreting them to require more than "mere" price differentials,
but also feelings of unwelcomeness, as well. See, e.g., Dock Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control
Comm'n, 101 Ill. App. 3d 673, 676-77, 428 N.E.2d 735, 738 (1981) (discount upheld because
owners did not exact higher price for men to discourage men from patronizing establishment,
nor did it have that effect); Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 107 Mich. App. 398,
402, 309 N.W.2d 615, 618 (1981) (discount upheld because owners did not withhold, refuse,
or deny accommodations to men); Magid v. Oak Park Racquet Club Assocs., 84 Mich. App.
522, 528, 269 N.W.2d 661, 664 (1978) (same); MacLean, 96 Wash. 2d at 344, 635 P.2d at 686
(discounts upheld because they were not calculated to cause male plaintiff to feel unwelcome
or unaccepted).
272 See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 269.
2" E.g., Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 107 Mich. App. 398, 402, 309 N.W.2d
615, 618 (1981) (interpreting statute requiring uniform pricing to be qualified by another
provision of state act); Magid v. Oak Park Racquet Club Assoc., 84 Mich. App. 522, 528; 269
N.W.2d 661, 664 (1978) (same).
271 See Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Dobrinoff, 80 Pa. Commnw. 453, 457, 471
A.2d 941, 943 (1984).
273 See, e.g., Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 36, 707 P.2d 195, 202, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 133, 140 (1985).
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defense, however, does not justify the price differences. Excluding
a category of protected persons because of greater profitability in
doing so would not make exclusions legal.274 Similarly, using sex-
based pricing because the practice is profitable will also not make
the promotion justifiable. Businesses are not hurt when ladies'
nights are discontinued because they can still use a variety of neutral
discounts, such as "two-for-ones," to encourage patronage without
discriminating on the basis of sex.
Proponents of gender-based price discounts also incorrectly
rely on the lack of public outcry against such discounts. What the
majority of males or females think about ladies' night, however, is
of no concern, especially when the relevant anti-discrimination stat-
utes focus on wrongs to individuals rather than to classes of per-
sons. 275 Generalizations about the opinions of classes as a whole are
unimportant, even if true, to the individual who is the victim of sex
discrimination.
Therefore, in order for our society to achieve true equality,
attitudinal ideas about even so-called minimal violations of sex dis-
crimination statutes must change. People must come to recognize
that striking down small distinctions in treatment between the sexes,
such as in ladies' night contexts, serves an important role in ridding
our country of gender discrimination. Attitudes about the impor-
tance of applying broad sex discrimination statutes should not differ
based on the magnitude of the violation. Unless persons realize
what is wrong with ladies' nights, required changes in other areas
such as employment will not be accompanied by healthy attitudes
supporting the improvement, and as such, will only amount to a
facade of equality.
If persons are aware of the harm in ladies' nights, however,
they will be able to transfer their enlightened attitudes to other
areas more quickly and easily. Tradition will no longer be the ruling
factor, and the sexes will be more apt to respect one another. In
effect, our society will be one step closer to equality. Important to
changing attitudes, then, is a clear realization of what is wrong with
them now and, as demonstrated, much is wrong with the attitude
that ladies' night promotions are acceptable.
"4 Id. at 32, 707.P.2d at 199, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
273 See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1979)
(citing Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)); set also
Karst, supra note 65, at 505 (maintaining that even if victims of discrimination accept their
treatment, the discrimination is still not lawful: "Even today some blacks may choose to ride
in the back of the bus.").
528	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 32:487
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts have split on the issue of whether ladies' night discounts
violate state public accommodation laws or their equivalents. Al-
though the trend in the past five or so years has been to invalidate
the promotions as unlawful sex discrimination, earlier courts inter-
preted broad anti-discrimination statutes to uphold sex-based pric-
ing. Most of the earlier courts noted the validity of businesses using
sex-based pricing to encourage female patronage when upholding
the discounts, and pointed to the lack of harm to the male plaintiffs.
Ladies' nights, however, do unlawfully discriminate on the basis
of sex. Courts and society at large should be aware of the harm
from the discounts. If courts uphold ladies' nights, they will be
reinforcing sexual stereotypes and paternalism, and as such, needed
overall changes in attitudes regarding the importance of striking
down so-called minor violations of sex discrimination will not occur.
This being the case, judges should recognize that both the male
plaintiffs and the potential female discount recipients are victims of
sex discrimination. When persons begin identifying the harmful
stereotypes resulting from the discounts, they will also recognize
that the discrimination involved in sex-based pricing is not trivial.
Finally, because many states have enacted broadly-worded anti-sex
discrimination statutes, courts have clear mandates requiring the
prohibition of sex-based pricing regardless of the promotion's prof-
itability or the difference in price owners offer the male and female
patrons. As a result, all sex-based pricing should be prohibited.
HEIDI C. PAULSON
